Bitcoin speciation · merge-mined rule histories

Not fork drama. Executable Bitcoin history.

The Forkgivening complex frames four Bitcoin-descended experiments around one constraint: miners should be able to test competing rule histories without giving up BTC mining revenue.

Core thesis

BTC remains the revenue base. Merged mining becomes the experiment layer.

Speciation here means multiple executable rule histories using Bitcoin-native claim inputs: Rune state, current BTC ownership, recent historical UTXOs, and deep historical UTXOs.

The problem

Bitcoin factions argue inside one scarce L1: Drivechain pressure, data austerity, Ordinals contamination, historical legitimacy, miner revenue, and claim inheritance all collapse into one social fight.

A single chain cannot safely perform every unresolved argument at once.

The Forkgivening move

Move the arguments into merge-mined descendants. Keep BTC mining as the center of revenue. Let old keys, Rune balances, and alternate rules become explicit claim surfaces.

Same mining event. Multiple optional Bitcoin histories.

BTC BLOCK FOUND BTC revenue stays primary additional commitments attach around the same work event CTB claim: FKGVN Rune state fee-only · flashmined BTX / ECX PRESSURE claim: current BTC ownership rule experiment, no BTC mutation BCK claim: pre-767,430 UTXOs pre-Ordinals clean history KNX claim: pre-79,400 UTXOs 50 KNX/block live
Four fork surfaces

Four different answers to what Bitcoin history can still do.

Each branch is a different claim input and a different experimental question. The coherence is not brand similarity. The coherence is miner-compatible execution.

CTB Rune state

Can FKGVN ownership become an allocation root for a merge-mined Bitcoin descendant?

  • Flashmined distribution
  • Rune-gated allocation
  • Fee-only miner thesis
  • 977,429 allocation horizon

BTX Rule pressure

Can ECX-style demand execute beside BTC instead of forcing BTC to absorb every rule fight?

  • ECX-adjacent pressure vessel
  • BIP300/301 rule family context
  • BTC remains center of mass
  • Experiment, do not mutate BTC

BCK Recent history

Can pre-Ordinals Bitcoin state anchor a clean-history descendant?

  • Pre-767,430 keys qualify
  • Zero Ordinals-tainted history
  • Cultural dispute becomes validation branch
  • Old UTXOs become credentials

KNX Deep history

Can an early Bitcoin monetary epoch be reopened under modern merged mining?

  • Pre-79,400 keys qualify
  • 50 KNX per block still live
  • Merge-mining or ticket lottery
  • Deep UTXOs as citizenship
Claim-surface matrix

Same mining event, four different claim boundaries.

Each fork names a claim input, a cutoff in Bitcoin history, and a fail-closed boundary: allocation happens only against admissible claim state, never by fiat. None of them mutate BTC itself.

Fork Claim input Qualifying cutoff Mint / supply mechanic Miner thesis Boundary
CTB FKGVN Rune state block 977,429 (allocation fixed) Rune-gated · fee-only · flashmined (1,500,000 CTB complete at 6,930,000) Fee-only allocation to FKGVN holders No allocation after cutoff snapshot
BTX Current BTC ownership None — ongoing alongside BTC ECX-adjacent pressure vessel; BIP300/301 family Additional fee demand beside BTC, no mutation Never forces BTC rule change
BCK Pre-Ordinals UTXOs block 767,430 Clean-history claim; old UTXOs become credentials Validation branch for the cultural dispute Ordinals-tainted history excluded
KNX Deep historical UTXOs block 79,400 50 KNX/block still live; merge-mining or ticket lottery Reopens an early monetary epoch under modern mining Deep UTXOs only
CTB two-clock model

The state crosses first. The asset materializes later.

Do not collapse the cutoff horizon and the full flashmine horizon. They are different events with different meanings.

NowFKGVN state evolves
977,429allocation fixed
6,930,0001,500,000 CTB complete
500,000
CTB tranche mapped to FKGVN state
633,340
630,000 premine + 334 mints × 10
7.89465
CTB allocation per 10 FKGVN
Interactive model

How many daily mints before one FKGVN mint stops being a CTB wholecoiner?

Adjust the assumptions. The model computes terminal FKGVN supply, CTB per FKGVN, CTB per standard 10-FKGVN mint, and the implied dilution regime.

Inputs

Outputs

101.35
4,309
734,687
0.68056
6.8056
1.62%
Wholecoiner thresholdabove 1 CTB

The dilution curve

CTB per standard 10-FKGVN mint as average mint rate rises. The curve falls monotonically toward the cap floor (≈0.079 CTB at 63,000,000 FKGVN). The red line marks the 1-CTB wholecoiner boundary — minting beyond ~4,309/day breaks it.

Scenario ladder

ScenarioMints/dayTerminal FKGVNCTB / FKGVNCTB / 10 FKGVN

Sensitivity grid — CTB per standard mint, by mint rate × allocation slice

Holding current height and supply fixed, how slice size changes allocation density. Rows are mint rates, columns are CTB allocation slices. Red cells fall below the 1-CTB wholecoiner boundary.

Blockspace pressure

Max exhaustion becomes a standing bid for Bitcoin blockspace.

The wholecoiner-breaking regime is small. The full-exhaustion regime is large. This distinction is the blockspace story.

Fee pressure lab

Blockspace outputs

427.35
85,469
8.55%
124.7 BTC
Bitcoin block occupancy from FKGVN mints8.55%
~4,300 mints/day can push one standard FKGVN mint toward 1 CTB, but it is tiny in blockspace terms.
~61,500 mints/day can exhaust remaining public mint supply, but then it becomes a sustained fee-market event.
Control surfaces

Every boundary is fail-closed. The axis of control is explicit.

Each fork is a decision surface between claim state and allocation. The default is denial: no allocation unless the claim is admissible. BTC itself is never a mutation target.

Allocation is gated, not granted.

CTB and BCK/KNX allocate only against admissible claim state — a snapshot, a cutoff, a qualifying UTXO. There is no discretionary mint.

No claim, no allocation.

Experiments stay beside BTC, not inside it.

BTX and the rule-family pressure vessels absorb demand outside the core chain. Bitcoin's own rule set is not the experiment surface.

Mutate the descendant, not the base.

Miner revenue is the load-bearing constraint.

The whole complex is viable only if merged mining preserves BTC as the center of revenue. Any fork that breaks that assumption fails closed.

Revenue first, experiments optional.

Memetic handles

Lines that carry the idea without flattening it.

One mint. One CTB wholecoiner, unless minting goes extreme.

Not a price. Not a swap. State → allocation.

Bitcoin does not need one fork war when miners can secure many experiments.

Assumptions and sources

Built as an editable model, not a frozen oracle.

The FKGVN/CTB values are entered as working assumptions from the current Forkgivening design conversation. BIP references are linked for public technical context.

Model assumptions

  • FKGVN current model supply: 633,340 = 630,000 premine + 334 public mints × 10.
  • FKGVN cap: 63,000,000; standard mint: 10 FKGVN.
  • CTB allocation slice modeled here: 500,000 CTB.
  • CTB flashmine total: 1,500,000 CTB, complete at block 6,930,000.
  • Allocation/cutoff horizon: Bitcoin block 977,429.
  • Default current height: 962,835. Edit it in the calculator.
  • Block capacity model: 1,000,000 vB/block for simple occupancy estimates.
  • Wholecoiner break rate = (10 × slice − supply) / (days × 10); exhaustion = (cap − supply) / (days × 10).