CTB Rune state
Can FKGVN ownership become an allocation root for a merge-mined Bitcoin descendant?
- Flashmined distribution
- Rune-gated allocation
- Fee-only miner thesis
- 977,429 allocation horizon
The Forkgivening complex frames four Bitcoin-descended experiments around one constraint: miners should be able to test competing rule histories without giving up BTC mining revenue.
Speciation here means multiple executable rule histories using Bitcoin-native claim inputs: Rune state, current BTC ownership, recent historical UTXOs, and deep historical UTXOs.
Bitcoin factions argue inside one scarce L1: Drivechain pressure, data austerity, Ordinals contamination, historical legitimacy, miner revenue, and claim inheritance all collapse into one social fight.
A single chain cannot safely perform every unresolved argument at once.
Move the arguments into merge-mined descendants. Keep BTC mining as the center of revenue. Let old keys, Rune balances, and alternate rules become explicit claim surfaces.
Same mining event. Multiple optional Bitcoin histories.
Each branch is a different claim input and a different experimental question. The coherence is not brand similarity. The coherence is miner-compatible execution.
Can FKGVN ownership become an allocation root for a merge-mined Bitcoin descendant?
Can ECX-style demand execute beside BTC instead of forcing BTC to absorb every rule fight?
Can pre-Ordinals Bitcoin state anchor a clean-history descendant?
Can an early Bitcoin monetary epoch be reopened under modern merged mining?
Each fork names a claim input, a cutoff in Bitcoin history, and a fail-closed boundary: allocation happens only against admissible claim state, never by fiat. None of them mutate BTC itself.
| Fork | Claim input | Qualifying cutoff | Mint / supply mechanic | Miner thesis | Boundary |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CTB | FKGVN Rune state | block 977,429 (allocation fixed) | Rune-gated · fee-only · flashmined (1,500,000 CTB complete at 6,930,000) | Fee-only allocation to FKGVN holders | No allocation after cutoff snapshot |
| BTX | Current BTC ownership | None — ongoing alongside BTC | ECX-adjacent pressure vessel; BIP300/301 family | Additional fee demand beside BTC, no mutation | Never forces BTC rule change |
| BCK | Pre-Ordinals UTXOs | block 767,430 | Clean-history claim; old UTXOs become credentials | Validation branch for the cultural dispute | Ordinals-tainted history excluded |
| KNX | Deep historical UTXOs | block 79,400 | 50 KNX/block still live; merge-mining or ticket lottery | Reopens an early monetary epoch under modern mining | Deep UTXOs only |
Do not collapse the cutoff horizon and the full flashmine horizon. They are different events with different meanings.
Adjust the assumptions. The model computes terminal FKGVN supply, CTB per FKGVN, CTB per standard 10-FKGVN mint, and the implied dilution regime.
CTB per standard 10-FKGVN mint as average mint rate rises. The curve falls monotonically toward the cap floor (≈0.079 CTB at 63,000,000 FKGVN). The red line marks the 1-CTB wholecoiner boundary — minting beyond ~4,309/day breaks it.
| Scenario | Mints/day | Terminal FKGVN | CTB / FKGVN | CTB / 10 FKGVN |
|---|
Holding current height and supply fixed, how slice size changes allocation density. Rows are mint rates, columns are CTB allocation slices. Red cells fall below the 1-CTB wholecoiner boundary.
The wholecoiner-breaking regime is small. The full-exhaustion regime is large. This distinction is the blockspace story.
Each fork is a decision surface between claim state and allocation. The default is denial: no allocation unless the claim is admissible. BTC itself is never a mutation target.
CTB and BCK/KNX allocate only against admissible claim state — a snapshot, a cutoff, a qualifying UTXO. There is no discretionary mint.
No claim, no allocation.
BTX and the rule-family pressure vessels absorb demand outside the core chain. Bitcoin's own rule set is not the experiment surface.
Mutate the descendant, not the base.
The whole complex is viable only if merged mining preserves BTC as the center of revenue. Any fork that breaks that assumption fails closed.
Revenue first, experiments optional.
One mint. One CTB wholecoiner, unless minting goes extreme.
Not a price. Not a swap. State → allocation.
Bitcoin does not need one fork war when miners can secure many experiments.
The FKGVN/CTB values are entered as working assumptions from the current Forkgivening design conversation. BIP references are linked for public technical context.